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ABSTRACT 
  In this Article, the Author explores the attempts made by the State of 
Alaska to implement various regulations on National Wildlife Refuge System 
(NWRS) lands in the state, examining the conflict between the State’s 
Intensive Management System and the mission of the NWRS, which is 
managed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, a federal agency. The Author 
discusses the concept of preemption generally and concludes that actions 
undertaken by Alaska’s Intensive Management System are in direct conflict 
with the federal mandates of the NWRS, and thus the State’s actions should 
be preempted. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................28 
I.   STATE INTENSIVE MANAGEMENT..........................................................28 
II.   FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE MANAGEMENT MANDATES...................31 
A.  National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act ..............31 
B.  Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act ..................34 
C.  Wilderness Act .............................................................................37 
D.  Are the Fish and Wildlife Service Manuals Binding on 
the Agency?...................................................................................40 
III.   PREEMPTION...........................................................................................41 
                                                 
Copyright © 2010 by Julie Lurman Joly. 
 * Assistant Professor of Resources Law and Policy, University of Alaska 
Fairbanks, School of Natural Resources and Agricultural Sciences; J.D. 
Georgetown University Law Center; M.E.S. Yale School of Forestry and 
Environmental Studies; B.S. Rutgers University. This work is funded in part by 
the USDA Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service, Hatch 
Project #0209760. SNRAS Pub. No. 2009-011. My thanks to Professor Robert 
Fischman, and to Jerry Berg, Danielle Jerry, Mike Boylan, and Roger Kaye of the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, for comments that substantially improved this 
manuscript. Any errors are my own. 
JOLY_FINAL.DOC 5/7/2010  5:33:59 PM 




The 2007 article, “Preemption of State Wildlife Law in Alaska: 
Where, When, and Why,”1 made the argument that attempts by the State 
of Alaska to implement its intensive management law or other 
regulations that amounted to an intensive type of wildlife management 
(such as managing for desirable prey species abundance at the cost of 
natural processes and population dynamics) on National Park Service 
lands were in direct conflict with the Park Service’s mandates as laid out 
by Congress, and should therefore be preempted on Park Service lands.2 
This conclusion left open the question of whether a similar problem 
exists with regard to other federal lands in Alaska. This follow-up 
Article examines the same issue from the perspective of the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Wildlife Refuge System 
(NWRS). 
Part I of this Article briefly describes state intensive management 
law and practices and their relevance to the NWRS. Part II provides an 
analysis of the relevant federal legislation guiding the FWS in its 
management of the NWRS, as well as the courts’ and FWS’s 
interpretations of that legislation. Part III presents the concept of 
preemption and its application in this context, followed by a discussion 
of the legality of intensive management on NWRS lands. 
I.  STATE INTENSIVE MANAGEMENT 
The federal government sets the rules and regulations for 
subsistence hunting on federal lands in Alaska, as required under the 
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA).3 In general, 
however, it is the State of Alaska that sets the terms for non-subsistence 
hunting in Alaska, on both federal and non-federal lands. Non-
                                                 
 1. Julie Lurman & Sanford P. Rabinowitch, Preemption of State Wildlife Law 
in Alaska: Where, When, and Why, 24 ALASKA L. REV. 145 (2007). 
 2. Id. at 146. 
 3. Pub. L. No. 96-487, §§ 801–816, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) [hereinafter ANILCA] 
(codified at 16 U.S.C. 410hh–3233 (2006), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1784 (2006)). Federal 
subsistence management falls under the authority of the federal subsistence 
board. The board comprises the Alaska regional directors of the Fish and 
Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, the Forest Service, the Bureau of 
Land Management, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, as well as the chair 
appointed by the Secretary of the Interior. DAVID CASE & DAVID VOLUCK, ALASKA 
NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 302 (2d ed. 2002). 
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subsistence hunting is allowed on nearly all refuge lands in Alaska. As a 
result, the State’s actions and policies can have a significant impact on 
refuge lands. Additionally, there is constant pressure from the State to 
harmonize federal subsistence hunting regulations with the State’s 
hunting regulations.4 
Alaska’s fish and wildlife management program, like most state 
wildlife programs, is geared toward providing hunting opportunities.5 
This tendency is exemplified by the State’s intensive management 
program. Intensive management in Alaska has two distinct faces: the 
first is the official Intensive Management program formalized through 
Section 16.05.255 of the Alaska Statutes, and the second is the regular use 
of an intensive type of wildlife management.6 
The goal of the State’s Intensive Management statute is to maintain, 
restore, or increase the abundance of certain game populations 
(specifically moose, caribou, and deer) for human consumption.7 The 
intention of the program is to maintain a “sustained yield,” which the 
statute defines as “the achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of the 
ability to support a high level of human harvest of game, subject to 
preferences among beneficial uses, on an annual or periodic basis.”8 The 
regulations implementing this statute require the Board of Game to 
“utilize active management of habitat and predation as the major tools 
to reverse any significant reduction in the allowable human harvest of 
the population.”9 If prey population levels set by the State are not being 
met in a particular game management unit, then the State must officially 
designate the unit as an Intensive Management area and implement 
intensive management practices.10 
Implementing intensive management may take the form of lethal 
predator control, but may also take various other forms, such as: 
[I]ncreasing bag limits and liberalizing hunting seasons for 
predators to increase their harvest; eliminating the need for 
hunters to obtain or purchase hunting tags or permits for 
                                                 
 4. See, e.g., Letter from Governor Frank Murkowski, State of Alaska, to 
Secretary Gale Norton, United States Department of the Interior (Jan. 10, 2005) 
(on file with author) (pressuring the federal subsistence board to defer to state 
hunting regulations).  
 5. Robert Fischman, From Words to Action: The Impact and Legal Status of the 
200 National Wildlife Refuge System Management Policies, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 77, 95 
(2007). 
 6. For a more complete discussion of this issue, see generally Lurman & 
Rabinowitch, supra note 1. 
 7. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.255 (2008). 
 8. Id. (emphasis added).  
 9. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.106(6) (2001).  
 10. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.255 (2008). 
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predators, thereby permitting the “incidental” taking of these 
animals; same day airborne hunting and trapping which allow 
taking the same day one flies in an aircraft; allowing easier and 
greater use of motor vehicles while hunting to increase the 
hunter’s advantage; expanding the allowable means and 
methods of hunting for predators, like baiting or feeding, 
thereby creating additional opportunities for taking; allowing 
the sale of raw hides and skulls thereby creating economic 
incentives for taking; and many others.11  
These less controversial, though more ubiquitous, regulatory 
changes typically apply to all hunters within the relevant game 
management unit. They even apply regardless of whether that unit 
encompasses federal lands or not, unless an exception is written into the 
regulation itself. Thirteen out of the sixteen federal wildlife refuges in 
Alaska overlap with officially designated Intensive Management areas.12 
Of those thirteen, twelve are entirely or largely within Intensive 
Management areas.13 While lethal predator control for prey 
enhancement is not currently permitted on any refuge in Alaska,14 the 
other types of Intensive Management activities mentioned above are 
permitted. This problem, therefore, is extremely pervasive. Over eighty 
percent of the refuges in Alaska are affected by Intensive Management, 
and for over ninety percent of those refuges affected, all or nearly all of 
the refuge’s land base is affected. 
The Intensive Management policy and the types of actions it 
engenders are technically limited to areas officially designated as 
“Intensive Management” areas and to species officially recognized by 
the Intensive Management statute.15 However, the philosophy behind 
the Intensive Management approach spills over to the regulation of 
other species and to areas outside those marked Intensive Management 
                                                 
 11. Lurman & Rabinowitch, supra note 1, at 156. 
 12. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.108 (where the game management 
units described as “positive” are Intensive Management Areas). 
 13. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.108.  
 14. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, United States Department of the 
Interior, Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuge, Biological Projects, Invasive 
Species Management, http://alaskamaritime.fws.gov/whatwedo/bioprojects/ 
restorebiodiversity/restoremain.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). There are some 
examples of predator control on refuges in Alaska for other purposes, such as 
removal of invasive species or protection of threatened or endangered species. 
Id. For example, in the Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuge, non-native, 
invasive foxes and rats have been removed to protect endangered, native bird 
species. Id. Intensive management techniques are also utilized by the FWS on 
some refuges in other states for similar reasons or where the maintenance of 
natural processes is no longer possible due to disturbance. Id.  
 15. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.255 (2008). 
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where the State is still primarily interested in providing game species for 
hunting. As such, many hunting regulations outside official Intensive 
Management areas are established with an eye toward limiting predator 
species in order to increase the abundance of game species for human 
hunting purposes.16 This broader concept of intensive wildlife 
management is also problematic for the FWS. 
II.  FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE MANAGEMENT MANDATES 
The FWS must meet obligations under many statutes in its 
management of the NWRS. Three statutes in particular provide the 
greatest source of authority and responsibility for the agency in its 
management capacity: (1) the 1997 National Wildlife Refuge System 
Improvement Act17 (which amended the National Wildlife Refuge 
System Administration Act of 196618); (2) the 1980 Alaska National 
Interest Lands Conservation Act;19 and (3) the Wilderness Act of 1964.20 
A.  National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act 
The National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act 
(“Improvement Act”) states that refuges must be managed to fulfill the 
overall mission of the refuge system and the purposes of the individual 
refuge.21 The Improvement Act states that the mission of the system is to 
“administer a national network of lands and waters for the conservation, 
management, and where appropriate, restoration of the fish, wildlife, 
and plants resources and their habitats within the United States for the 
benefit of present and future generations of Americans.”22 The statute 
defines “conservation” and “management” as synonymous, both 
meaning “to sustain and, where appropriate, restore and enhance, 
healthy populations of fish, wildlife, and plants utilizing . . . methods and 
                                                 
 16. For example, Proposal No. 156, passed in March 2003, increased the 
hunting season and bag limits for coyote in many units, in part because the 
“board recognized the pressure on [Dall Sheep] and small game populations” 
due to coyote predation (Dall Sheep are not targeted by the Intensive 
Management Statute). See Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Summary of 
Actions, http://www.boards.adfg.state.ak.us/fishinfo/meetsum/meetsum.php 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2010). 
 17. Pub. L. No. 105-57, 111 Stat. 1252–1260 (1997).  
 18. Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 927 (1966) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd–
668ee (2006)).  
 19. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3233 (2006). 
 20. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136 (2006). 
 21. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(3)–(4) (2006). Where system mission and refuge 
purposes conflict, individual refuge purposes take precedence. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd 
(a)(4)(D) (2006).  
 22. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2) (2006).  
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procedures associated with modern scientific resource programs.”23 This 
restates the system mission without providing much additional 
guidance,24 though it makes clear that maintenance of “healthy 
populations” is part of the statute’s goal. 
Professor Robert Fischman suggests two possible interpretations of 
the phrase “healthy populations:” (1) healthy is “only a quantitative 
threshold where population levels are sustainable;” or (2) healthy 
“would include both quantitative characteristics (e.g., the number of 
individuals in a population) and qualitative attributes (e.g., the 
condition of health).”25 Neither interpretation is necessarily incompatible 
with the idea of suppressing some populations in an effort to establish 
an abundance of other populations; this is what the State of Alaska 
professes it will do, while still maintaining sustainable levels of all 
populations.26 
A third possible interpretation is that “healthy populations” should 
be understood in light of ANILCA, which was passed seventeen years 
before the Improvement Act and also employs “healthy populations” as 
a management standard.27 There are several reasons why it seems likely 
that Congress had at least one eye on ANILCA when drafting the 
Improvement Act. First, ANILCA represents a first attempt by Congress 
to create management goals for wildlife refuges that transcend a single 
refuge—something the Improvement Act accomplishes on a larger scale. 
Second, as stated above, the two statutes employ remarkably similar 
“healthy populations” language in fleshing out the agency’s 
management goal.28 Third, the Improvement Act specifically mentions 
ANILCA and states that where the two conflict, ANILCA supersedes the 
Improvement Act.29 It makes sense, then, that the “healthy populations” 
language in both statutes was intended to mean the same thing. 
Otherwise, Congress would have established a deliberate conflict 
between the management of refuges in Alaska and the management of 
refuges in the rest of the country. This outcome seems extremely 
unlikely given that one of the purposes behind the Improvement Act 
                                                 
 23. 16 U.S.C. § 668ee(4) (2006) (emphasis added).  
 24. ROBERT L. FISCHMAN, THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGES: COORDINATING A 
CONSERVATION SYSTEM THROUGH LAW 81 (2003). 
 25. Id. at 81–82. 
 26. See Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Wildlife Conservation, 
http://www.wildlife.alaska.gov/index.cfm?adfg=control.main (last visited Apr. 
10, 2010) (describing the goals of intensive management to raise levels of 
huntable prey species while “maintaining healthy populations of all . . . 
resources, including moose, caribou, wolves, and bears”). 
 27. See ANILCA, supra note 3, § 802. 
 28. The ANILCA language will be examined in detail, infra Part II.B.  
 29. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(e)(1)(a) (2006). 
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was to create greater coordination within the refuge system.30 Fourth, 
ANILCA was a testing ground for other management concepts that have 
since become major components of the Improvement Act, most notably 
the requirement to perform refuge-level planning.31 Lastly, 
Representative Don Young of Alaska was Chair of the House Resources 
Committee at the time the Improvement Act was being drafted and 
debated.32 It is likely he was intimately familiar with the language and 
requirements of ANILCA since that statute has had such an important 
impact on the State of Alaska. 
By understanding the “healthy populations” language of the 
Improvement Act in terms of the “healthy populations” language of 
ANILCA, it is clear that this management criterion truly does conflict 
with state goals of artificially increasing prey numbers by removing or 
greatly limiting the number of predators from the system.33 
In meeting its system mission, the FWS must “ensure that . . . 
biological integrity, diversity, and environmental health are maintained . 
. . .”34 The statute does not provide a definition for this language, but the 
agency provides an interpretation in its manual.35 “Biological integrity” 
is defined as “biotic composition, structure, and functioning at genetic, 
organism, and community levels comparable with historic conditions, 
including the natural biological processes that shape genomes, organisms, 
and communities.”36 “Biological diversity” is defined as “the variety of 
life and its processes, including the variety of living organisms . . . and 
the communities and ecosystems in which they occur.”37 
“Environmental health” refers to the composition structure and 
functioning of abiotic features and processes (i.e., non-living chemical 
                                                 
 30. National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 
105-57, § 5, 111 Stat. 1252 (1997).  
 31. Id. § 7. 
 32. CLERK OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, LIST OF STANDING 
COMMITTEES AND SELECT COMMITTEES AND THEIR SUBCOMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES TOGETHER WITH JOINT COMMITTEES OF THE 
CONGRESS WITH AN ALPHABETICAL LIST OF THE MEMBERS AND THEIR COMMITTEE 
ASSIGNMENTS, ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS 22 (1997), available at http:// 
clerk.house.gov/105/scsfinal105.pdf. 
 33. It is also worth noting that the Improvement Act defines “fish and 
wildlife” to mean “any wild member of the animal kingdom,” and therefore the 
protections afforded by the statute apply not only to commercially or 
recreationally valuable species, but to all species. 16 U.S.C. § 668ee(7) (2006).  
 34. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(B) (2006). 
 35. See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE MANUAL: LAND USE AND 
MANAGEMENT SERIES: BIOLOGICAL INTEGRITY, DIVERSITY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
HEALTH, 601 FW 3.6(A)–(E) (2001). 
 36. Id. at 3.6(B) (emphasis added).  
 37. Id. at 3.6(A). 
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and physical environmental factors).38 Lastly, “historic conditions” are 
defined as the “composition, structure, and functioning of ecosystems 
resulting from natural processes that we believe, based on sound 
professional judgment, were present prior to substantial human related 
changes to the landscape.”39 Further, in explaining the agency’s position, 
the manual states that the agency favors “management that restores or 
mimics natural ecosystem processes or functions. . . .”40 On the specific 
issue of population management, the manual states that the agency 
“formulate[s] refuge goals and objectives for population management by 
considering natural densities, social structures, and population dynamics at 
the refuge level. . . . [The agency] manages populations for natural 
densities and levels of variation.”41 This language indicates that, for the 
agency to meet the system mission of wildlife conservation, the FWS 
must maintain natural densities, population dynamics, and levels of 
population variation that reflect historic conditions.42 This suggests that 
any State attempts to manipulate population densities, dynamics, or 
levels of variation to achieve unnatural results are directly in conflict 
with FWS requirements.43 
B.  Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 
ANILCA44 is the establishment legislation for most refuges in 
Alaska, and it expanded the area of all pre-existing refuges. ANILCA, 
therefore, provides nearly all of the refuge purposes for each of the 
                                                 
 38. Id. at 3.6(C). 
 39. Id. at 3.6(D) (emphasis added). 
 40. Id. at 3.7(E). 
 41. Id. at 3.14(B)–(C) (emphasis added). 
 42. The manual even goes so far as to say that if “events occurring off refuge 
lands or waters may injure or destroy biological integrity, diversity, and 
environmental health of a refuge,” the agency’s responsibility to the public 
resources in its care requires that “refuge managers . . . address these problems.” 
Id. at 601 FW 3.20. 
 43. The Fish and Wildlife Service developed a policy on biological integrity 
of having the species’ composition, abundance and interrelationships with each 
other and with their habitat comparable to historical conditions. Under the 
policy, predators and prey would be managed for natural densities and levels of 
variation using historical conditions as the frame of reference. See Greg Bos, 
former FWS Alaska Subsistence Coordinator, Remarks at an Eastern Interior 
Federal Subsistence Regional Advisory Council Meeting 164–65 (Oct. 18, 2006) 
(transcript on file with author). Similarly, Freyfogle and Goble argue that this 
language “calls for the conservation of basic ecological processes with little 
human alteration, including the natural biological processes that shape genomes, 
organisms, and communities.” ERIC T. FREYFOGLE & DALE D. GOBLE, WILDLIFE 
LAW: A PRIMER 212 (2009) (emphasis added). 
 44. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3233 (2006). 
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refuges in Alaska.45 Meeting refuge purposes is the second part of the 
central management mandate for the FWS and supersedes the system 
mission where a conflict exists. The purposes for each refuge in Alaska 
are listed separately in Sections 302 and 303 of ANILCA.46 Each set of 
purposes are somewhat customized for each particular refuge, yet they 
all contain the same basic language.47 The general purposes for the 
Alaskan refuges are to “conserve fish and wildlife populations and 
habitats in their natural diversity . . . to fulfill international treaty 
obligations with respect to fish and wildlife and their habitats . . . and to 
ensure water quality and quantity within refuges in a manner consistent 
with wildlife conservation.”48 
Neither ANILCA nor the FWS has formally defined the phrase 
“natural diversity,”49 and the courts have not had an opportunity to 
interpret this language. By looking at the legislative history, however, 
we can get an idea of what the phrase was intended to mean. The Senate 
Report on ANILCA states that the refuges set aside by the statute 
represent “the opportunity to manage these areas on a planned 
ecosystem-wide basis with all of their pristine ecological processes intact.”50 
The conservation of “natural diversity,” therefore, was not intended to 
mean only the number of species present on the landscape, but also the 
conservation of the natural interactions, dynamics, cycles, and processes 
within and between species in these areas. Essentially, “natural 
diversity” should be seen as simply an earlier iteration of the “biological 
integrity, diversity, and environmental health” criteria which surfaced 
later in the Improvement Act. 
In addition to providing refuge purposes, ANILCA also provides 
another layer of management requirements for Alaska refuges. ANILCA 
requires that federal agencies manage wildlife in a manner that is 
consistent with “the conservation of healthy populations of fish and 
wildlife.”51 The legislative history specifically defines this phrase to 
mean the “maintenance of fish and wildlife resources and their habitats 
in a condition which assures stable and continuing natural populations 
and species mix of plants and animals.”52 This indicates that the intention 
                                                 
 45. The refuges that pre-date ANILCA also have additional refuge purposes 
derived from their various establishment documents.  
 46. ANILCA, supra note 3, §§ 302–303.  
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. (emphasis added).  
 49. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE & U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CLIMATE 
CHANGE FORUM FOR ALASKA 14 (2007), available at http://alaska.fws.gov/ 
climate/pdf/executive_summary.pdf. 
 50. S. REP. NO. 69-413, at 174 (1979). 
 51. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3112(1), 3125(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 52. S. REP. NO. 96-413, at 233. 
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of the “healthy populations” language was more than simply a reference 
to a sustainable quantitative threshold or a condition of health, but 
rather a broader reference to preservation of the natural population 
dynamics and interspecies cycles that existed on the landscape before 
European contact. This understanding is supported by additional 
statements made in the Senate Report:  
[T]hese units will assure to the greatest extent possible the 
protection of the ecological units and processes that support 
entire habitats for Alaska’s diverse fish and wildlife resources. . 
. . For each unit the key wildlife species are listed. However, the 
committee feels that while it is important to focus attention on 
the major species of each refuge, it is equally important that the 
Fish and Wildlife Service manage these units to conserve the 
entire spectrum of plant and animal life found on the refuge. 
Alaska is unique in this country in that it is the last place where 
man has not adversely affected the balance of nature. . . . For 
example, the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge should be 
managed to conserve the diversity of fish and wildlife 
populations of the refuge and not merely the Porcupine caribou 
herd. Therefore, focusing purely on prey abundance is clearly 
not what the drafters had in mind.53  
 The FWS manual has adopted the Senate Report’s definition of 
“healthy populations” in its interpretation of ANILCA.54 The agency 
should also formally adopt this understanding of “healthy populations” 
in its interpretation of the Improvement Act. 
The legislative history further states that the management 
techniques employed must “minimize the likelihood of irreversible or 
long term adverse effects upon such populations and species. . . . The 
greater the ignorance of the resource parameters, particularly of the 
ability and capacity of a population or species to respond to changes in 
its ecosystem, the greater the safety factor must be.”55 This congressional 
warning is becoming increasingly relevant as Alaska and Alaskan 
wildlife continue to feel the impacts and uncertainties of climate change. 
All Alaskan refuges, except for the Kenai National Wildlife Refuge, 
are also mandated to provide the opportunity for continued subsistence 
use by local rural residents, but only if this use does not interfere with 
                                                 
 53. Id.  
 54. Guidance as to the meaning of “healthy populations” is found in the 
Alaska Lands Act legislative history. See Alaska National Wildlife Refuges, 
Interim Management Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 31,818 (June 17, 1981) (codified at 
50 C.F.R. pt. 36). 
 55. S. REP. NO. 96-413, at 233. 
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the wildlife conservation and treaty obligation mandates.56 Section 3114 
of ANILCA restricts subsistence uses “in order to protect the continued 
viability” of fish and wildlife populations. Section 3125(1) of ANILCA 
states that the law does not permit subsistence uses where they are 
“inconsistent with the conservation of healthy populations.” The FWS 
interprets the two limitations in a single standard that requires that “fish 
and wildlife resources and their habitats [remain] in a condition which 
assures stable and continuing natural populations and species mix of 
plants and animals in relation to their ecosystem . . . ,”57 rather than in 
relation to state or human needs and wants. This interpretation is clearly 
derived from the legislative history.58 
Subsistence hunting, therefore, is to be supported on refuges in 
Alaska as long as it does not interfere with the two purposes that have 
been given higher priority by ANILCA: conservation of species and 
meeting treaty obligations. Furthermore, the statute is specific about 
what must happen if wildlife population numbers decrease for any 
reason. First, non-subsistence hunting must be decreased or stopped. If 
that is insufficient to protect the affected wildlife populations, then 
subsistence hunting must be stopped as well.59 The statute does not 
contemplate intensive types of wildlife management to maintain 
“huntable” levels of game. 
C.  Wilderness Act 
Of the sixteen National Wildlife Refuges in Alaska, ten contain 
“wilderness areas” designated by ANILCA.60 These wilderness 
designations essentially establish an additional refuge purpose that the 
agency must meet in its administration of the refuge.61 The FWS has 
stated that “[w]ilderness purposes are ‘within and supplemental’ to 
refuge establishing purposes.”62 To meet this additional purpose, the 
agency must meet the requirements of the Wilderness Act,63 which 
establishes the federal government’s responsibilities in managing 
                                                 
 56. ANILCA, supra note 3, §§ 302–303; see also MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. 
ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 300 (3d ed. 1997). 
 57. S. REP. NO. 96-413, at 233 (1979); 46 Fed. Reg. 31,818 (June 17, 1981) (to be 
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 36) (emphasis added).  
 58. See S. REP. NO. 96-413, at 233. 
 59. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3114, 3126(b) (2006). See also Lurman & Rabinowitch, supra 
note 1, at 151. 
 60. ANILCA, supra note 3, §§ 701–704.  
 61. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE MANUAL: LAND USE & MANAGEMENT: 
GENERAL OVERVIEW OF WILDERNESS STEWARDSHIP POLICY, 610 FW 1.14(A), 1.17 
(2008). 
 62. Id. at 1.12(B).  
 63. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136 (2006). 
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wilderness areas. The Act states that “[a] wilderness . . . is hereby 
recognized as an area where the earth and its community of life are 
untrammeled by man . . . an area of undeveloped federal land retaining 
its primeval character and influence . . . which is protected and managed 
so as to preserve its natural conditions. . . .”64 The FWS interprets the 
term “untrammeled” to mean “the freedom of a landscape from the 
human intent to permanently intervene, alter, control, or manipulate 
natural conditions or processes.”65 The Wilderness Act requires agencies 
to manage wilderness areas in a manner that preserves the “wilderness 
character” of the area.66 To this end, the FWS has stated that: 
Maintaining wilderness character requires an attitude of 
humility and restraint. In wilderness, we do not adjust nature 
to suit people, but adjust human use and influences so as not to 
alter natural processes. We strengthen wilderness character 
with every decision to forego actions that have physical impact 
or would detract from the idea of wilderness as a place set 
apart, a place where human uses, convenience, and expediency 
do not dominate. We preserve wilderness character by our 
compliance with wilderness legislation and regulation, but also 
by imposing limits on ourselves.67 
Furthermore, the agency’s manual states that the FWS will not 
interfere with major ecosystem processes (in which the FWS explicitly 
includes “predator/prey fluctuations”) “unless necessary to accomplish 
refuge purposes.”68 To be considered “necessary,” the agency states that 
the action “to modify ecosystems, species populations levels, or natural 
processes must be: required to respond to a human emergency or the 
minimum requirement for administering the area as wilderness. . . .”69 
The statutory language and the agency’s interpretations of that language 
both suggest that to preserve the wilderness character of untrammeled 
lands effectively, natural processes and conditions must be protected. 
Such processes and conditions must necessarily include natural 
predator/prey relationships and cycles.70 
                                                 
 64. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2006). 
 65. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 61, at 1.5(DD). 
 66. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (2006).  
 67. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 61, at 1.13(D). 
 68. Id. at 2.16(B)(1) (emphasis added). 
 69. Id. at 2.16(B)(3). 
 70. As Roger Kaye, Wilderness Specialist for the Arctic National Wildlife 
Refuge, wrote, “wilderness has always been inseparable from wildlife.” ROGER 
KAYE, LAST GREAT WILDERNESS: THE CAMPAIGN TO ESTABLISH THE ARCTIC 
NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE 215 (2006). 
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The courts have had several opportunities to assess the FWS’s 
responsibilities under the Wilderness Act. In Sierra Club v. Lyng,71 an 
environmental group challenged a Forest Service program that 
combated insect infestation by cutting trees and spraying chemicals.72 
The purpose of the program was to protect commercial timber interests 
and private property outside the wilderness area, “not to further 
wilderness interests or to further national wilderness policy.”73 
Ultimately, the court “imposed an affirmative burden on the Secretary of 
Agriculture to justify the eradication program in light of wilderness 
values.”74  
In Wilderness Society v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Services, the Wilderness 
Society claimed that the FWS violated the Wilderness Act by permitting 
a salmon enhancement project (which introduced approximately six 
million hatchery-raised salmon fry into a wilderness lake) because the 
project was hostile to the mandate to preserve “natural conditions” that 
are part of “wilderness character.”75 The court declined to reach the issue 
of whether the project actually violated natural conditions,76 yet it struck 
down the permit. It held that the primary purpose of the project was to 
aid commercial fishermen and that the Wilderness Act forbids 
wilderness areas from being used for commercial enterprises.77 The 
court stated that, “Whatever else may be said about the positive aims of 
the Enhancement Project, it was not designed to advance the purpose of 
the Wilderness Act.”78  
Actions in wilderness areas therefore must be justified in terms of 
whether they further the goals and values of the Wilderness Act.79 The 
sole purpose of intensively managing prey species in Alaska is to 
increase harvestable prey numbers beyond naturally occurring levels to 
meet a human desire for increased hunting opportunity.80 This purpose 
                                                 
 71. 662 F. Supp. 40 (D.D.C. 1987). 
 72. Id. at 41. 
 73. Id. at 42. 
 74. No. 01-35266, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27248, *28 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 2003), 
amended by Wilderness Society v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 360 F.3d 1374 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citing Lyng, 662 F. Supp. at 42–43). 
 75. Id. at *2. 
 76. Id. at *46 n.18. 
 77. Id. at *33–34. 
 78. Id. at *23.  
 79. Id. at *44; see also High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 436 F. 
Supp. 2d 1117, 1133–34 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (“Because it is not possible to infer [from 
the language of the Wilderness Act] that establishment (much less enhancement) 
of opportunities for a particular form of human recreation is the purpose of the 
Wilderness Act, it is not possible to conclude that enhancement of fisheries is an 
activity that is ‘necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration 
of the area for the purposes of this chapter.’”).  
 80. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.255(e) (2008). 
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does not further wilderness interests or national wilderness policy, and 
is therefore also inappropriate on refuge wilderness areas. 
D.  Are the Fish and Wildlife Service Manuals Binding on the 
Agency? 
The FWS’s interpretations of both the Improvement Act and 
ANILCA were made through policy statements in the Fish and Wildlife 
Service Manual and not through regulations in the Code of Federal 
Regulations (C.F.R.). These interpretations, however, have often been 
subjected to notice and comment procedures. Furthermore, they are 
published in draft and final form in the Federal Register, along with a 
complete discussion of the comments received throughout the comment 
period.81 The question of whether courts will bind agencies to legal 
interpretations made through manual provisions rather than the C.F.R. 
is very complicated. In McGrail & Rowley v. Babbitt,82 the court found that 
the FWS manual was not binding on the agency.83 The manual 
provisions reviewed in that case, however, had not been promulgated 
using notice and comment procedures,84 while many of the manual 
provisions cited in this Article have been subject to notice and comment.  
In Wilderness Society, the court analyzed whether the FWS’s 
administrative interpretations of statutory mandates required 
deference.85 Ultimately, the court determined that deference was not 
required, primarily because the specific case “involve[d] only an 
agency’s application of law in a particular permitting context, and not an 
interpretation of a statute that will have the force of law generally for 
others in similar circumstances.”86 The statements made in the manuals 
relied upon in this Article, however, are general interpretations. Thus, 
even though they are intended to guide agency behavior rather than the 
public’s behavior, they might be regarded as having the force of law. 
In Wilderness Society v. Norton,87 the D.C. Circuit noted that courts 
should examine two issues when determining whether or not to bind 
agencies to their non-regulatory interpretations: the effects of the agency 
                                                 
 81. See, e.g., Policy on Maintaining the Biological Integrity, Diversity, and 
Environmental Health of the National Wildlife Refuge System, 66 Fed. Reg. 3818 
(Jan. 16, 2001); 46 Fed. Reg. 31,818 (Jun. 17, 1981); FISCHMAN, supra note 24, at 110.  
 82. 986 F. Supp. 1386 (S.D. Fla. 1997). 
 83. Id. at 1394. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Wilderness Society v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 01-35266, 2003 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 27248, *40 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 2003). 
 86. Id. 
 87. 434 F.3d 584 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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action and the expressed intention of the agency.88 FWS has manifested 
its intent to be bound, at least in part, by its decision to employ notice 
and comment procedures and issue publication through the Federal 
Register.89 On the other hand, the state of the law in this area is not 
completely settled, and since the FWS’s manual contains some mixed 
messages about the agency’s intent to be bound,90 it is possible that a 
court would not find the manual provisions binding.91 
III.  PREEMPTION 
“When a portion of a refuge is open to hunting or fishing, state law 
governing those activities generally applies unless it conflicts with some 
federal law or a specific refuge regulation.”92 Where there is a conflict, 
the solution is for the federal agency to preempt state law. The courts 
have found that actual conflict is necessary before the FWS can preempt 
the state under the Improvement Act.93 In Wyoming v. United States, 
Wyoming sued the FWS and the Department of the Interior for refusing 
to allow the state to vaccinate wild elk on the National Elk Range, a part 
of the NWRS.94 The complaint alleged that the FWS interfered “with the 
State’s sovereign right to manage wildlife within its borders.”95 The 
court recognized that “[h]istorically, States have possessed ‘broad 
trustee and police powers over . . . wildlife within their borders, 
including . . . wildlife found on Federal lands within a State.’”96 The 
                                                 
 88. Id. at 595; see also Davis v. Latchar, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1998) (aff’d 
in Davis v. Latchar, 202 F.3d 359, 361 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding that since the Park 
Service expressed its intention to be bound by its Management Policies, those 
Management Policies were binding on the agency). 
 89. Norton, 434 F.3d at 595–96. For a complete discussion of this issue, see 
generally Fischman, supra note 5. “In return for its investment in the notice-and-
comment procedure, the Service should receive from courts greater deference to 
its interpretations of the refuge organic law. But this comes at the price of 
binding the agency to it published determinations.” Id. at 121. Contra Robert A. 
Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE 
J. ON REG. 1 (1990). 
 90. The manual provisions are “intended to improve the internal 
management of the Service, and [the manual] is not intended to, and does not, 
create [a judicially enforceable] right or benefit.” Policy on National Wildlife 
Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997 Mission and Goals and Refuge 
Purposes and Uses, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,404 (June 26, 2006). “The tension between the 
actual manual provision and the disclaimer . . . leaves some room for debate 
over their binding status.” Fischman, supra note 5, at 127. 
 91. Fischman, supra note 5, at 126–27. 
 92. FISCHMAN, supra note 24, at 184. 
 93. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); Wyoming v. United 
States, 279 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 94. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1218. 
 95. Id. at 1222 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 96. Id. at 1226 (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 24.3).  
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court, however, also recognized the Supreme Court’s decision in Kleppe 
v. New Mexico97 and stated that the Property Clause of the Constitution98 
“empowers Congress to exercise jurisdiction over federal land within a 
State if Congress so chooses.”99 The court also noted that “if Congress so 
chooses, federal legislation, together with the policies and objectives 
encompassed therein, necessarily override and preempt conflicting state 
laws, policies, and objectives under the Constitution’s Supremacy 
Clause.”100 The question then, according to the Tenth Circuit, was 
whether the Improvement Act actually conflicted with the state’s 
vaccination program.101 Ultimately, the court held that the FWS could 
not fulfill its mission as set forth in the Improvement Act unless refuges 
are “consistently directed and managed as a national system. . . . 
Congress undoubtedly intended a preeminent federal role for the FWS 
in the care and management of the NWRS.”102 “Congress intended 
ordinary principles of conflict preemption to apply,”103 and as such, the 
FWS had the authority to preempt state law and deny permission to the 
state to vaccinate the elk.104 
In National Audubon Society v. Davis,105 the Audubon Society sued 
California state officials for implementing a ballot proposition that 
banned the use of certain traps and poisons to capture or kill wildlife.106 
The Audubon Society was concerned that this proposition would restrict 
the federal government’s ability to eliminate invasive species and limit 
the ability to protect endangered birds from predators on National 
Wildlife Refuges.107 The group claimed that the Improvement Act, 
among other federal laws, preempted the proposition.108 The court 
agreed that the Improvement Act did preempt the proposition “to the 
extent that actual conflict persists between state and federal policies.”109 
The court defined conflict preemption by quoting the Supreme Court’s 
                                                 
 97. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).  
 98. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose 
of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 
Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be 
so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular 
State.”). 
 99. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1227. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1234. 
 102. Id. at 1233–34. 
 103. Id. at 1234. 
 104. Id. at 1235. 
 105. 307 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 106. Id. at 842–43. 
 107. Id. at 844. 
 108. Id. at 842. 
 109. Id. at 854. 
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opinion in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul,110 which stated that 
actual conflict arises when “compliance with both federal and state 
regulations is a physical impossibility.”111 The Audubon Society court, 
following the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Wyoming, found that “Congress 
invoked federal power under the Property Clause when it enacted the 
[Improvement Act], and that the [Improvement Act] ‘plainly vests the 
FWS with authority to administer the Act and manage the [National 
Wildlife Refuges].’”112 The Audubon Society court held that since National 
Wildlife Refuges are federal government land, Congress has the 
authority under the Property Clause to preempt state action with respect 
to National Wildlife Refuge management and has done so through the 
Improvement Act.113 Additionally, according to the court, the 
Improvement Act preempts the state proposition “because the ban on 
[certain types of] traps conflicts with FWS’s statutory management 
authority on those federal reserves.”114 
Similarly, with regard to intensive wildlife management in Alaska, 
there is direct conflict between the goals and methods of the State’s 
program and the mandates set by Congress for the management of the 
NWRS. The Improvement Act, ANILCA, and the Wilderness Act all 
require the FWS to preserve natural conditions and processes,115 yet the 
state would like to interfere in these processes to increase harvestable 
prey at the expense of predator abundance.116 These two goals and the 
methodology used to achieve them are mutually exclusive. As such, the 
FWS must preempt those attempts the State makes to eliminate 
predators in order to intensively manage prey species. 
The Savings and Cooperation Clauses found in the Improvement 
Act and ANILCA are also relevant. The Improvement Act contains 
several clauses requiring “effective cooperation and collaboration with 
Federal agencies and State fish and wildlife agencies during the course 
of acquiring and managing refuges.”117 This requirement for conformity, 
however, is tempered by language that only requires cooperation “to the 
extent practicable.”118 Similarly, the Savings Clause in the Improvement 
Act, stating that “[n]othing in this Act shall be construed as affecting the 
                                                 
 110. 373 U.S. 132 (1963). 
 111. Audubon Soc’y, 307 F.3d at 851–52 (quoting Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 142–
43)).  
 112. Id. at 854 (quoting Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1228 (10th 
Cir. 2002)). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See supra Part II. 
 116. See supra Part I. 
 117. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(M) (2006).  
 118. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(e)(1)(A)(iii) (2006).  
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authority, jurisdiction, or responsibility of the several States to manage, 
control, or regulate fish and resident wildlife under State law or 
regulations in any area within the System,” is tempered by a second 
sentence stating that “[r]egulations permitting hunting or fishing of fish 
and resident wildlife within the System shall be, to the extent practicable, 
consistent with State fish and wildlife laws, regulations, and 
management plans.”119 In Wyoming, the Tenth Circuit wrote, interpreting 
the Savings and Cooperation Clauses: “We find highly unlikely the 
proposition that Congress would carefully craft the substantive 
provisions of the [Improvement Act] to grant authority to the FWS to 
manage the [refuges] and promulgate regulations thereunder, and then 
essentially nullify those provisions and regulations with a single 
sentence.”120 
The Savings Clause is not meaningless; it simply indicates that 
ordinary principles of conflict preemption apply where necessary.121 
Neither is the Cooperation Clause a meaningless provision,122 as a 
failure on the part of the FWS to work cooperatively with state agencies 
is reviewable by the courts.123 Further, the FWS must be able to explain 
why the State’s program would “stand as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution” of federal goals.124 Thus, the 
Cooperation and Savings Clauses of the Improvement Act: 
[D]o not ultimately limit the ability of refuge managers to carry 
out their missions. Nor do they empower states to resist a 
lawful federal action since a state law cannot interfere with the 
accomplishment of a federal objective. States can insist on being 
consulted, but it is up to federal managers to decide when and 
whether it is “practicable” for state law to remain in force. In 
the case of conflict with a federal action or policy, state law 
must give way.125 
                                                 
 119. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(m) (2006) (emphasis added).  
 120. Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1234–35 (internal citations 
omitted).  
 121. Id. at 1234. Similarly, the Supreme Court has stated, “Why, in any event, 
would Congress not have wanted ordinary pre-emption principles to apply 
where an actual conflict with a federal objective is at stake? . . . In its absence, 
state law could impose legal duties that would conflict directly with federal 
regulatory mandates.” Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 871–72 
(2000).  
 122. See Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1236. 
 123. See id. at 1236–37.  
 124. Id. at 1240 (quoting Geier, 529 U.S. at 883) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 125. FREYFOGLE & GOBLE, supra note 43, at 215; see also Fischman, supra note 23, 
at 88 (“[T]he act itself requires coordination with states in the administration of 
the [s]ystem . . . . This partnership with states is, of course, limited by federal 
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ANILCA also contains clauses encouraging cooperation126 and 
reserving authority to the state,127 but like the Improvement Act, these 
clauses are tempered by language that preserves federal authority in 
cases of conflict.128 
Finally, the Master Memorandum of Understanding (MMOU) 
existing between the FWS and the Alaska State Department of Fish and 
Game must be considered.129 The MMOU was originally written and 
signed in 1982 and then recommitted (though not amended) in 2006.130 
One could argue that the MMOU relieves the FWS of the need to go 
through the compatibility determination process when the state wishes 
to take wildlife management action on NWRS lands, or alternatively, 
that the MMOU requires the FWS to defer to the State regarding most 
wildlife management matters. Neither of these interpretations, however, 
agrees with the actual language of the MMOU or the language of the 
statutes under which the NWRS must be managed. Among other 
commitments, the agencies agree in the MMOU that: (1) wildlife 
populations on NWRS lands must be managed “in their natural 
diversity”; (2) the state has the right to enter NWRS lands “at any time to 
conduct routine management activities which do not involve 
construction, disturbance to the land, or alteration of ecosystems”; and (3) 
the taking of fish and wildlife on NWRS lands is “authorized in 
accordance with State and Federal law unless State regulations are found to 
be incompatible with documented Refuge goals, objectives, or management 
plans.”131 
In 2000, the FWS interpreted its responsibility to make 
compatibility determinations for all refuge uses as excluding “refuge 
                                                                                                             
preemption of state law that conflicts with FWS management control on refuges. 
For instance, a state may not impose its own hunting/trapping regulations or 
property law restrictions on the Refuge System under circumstances where they 
would frustrate decisions made by the Service or Congress.”). 
 126. 16 U.S.C. § 3112(3) (2006). 
 127. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3112(3), 3202 (2006). 
 128. See id. For a full discussion of ANILCA cooperation and savings clauses, 
see Lurman & Rabinowitch, supra note 1, at 153–54.  
 129. Master Memorandum of Understanding Between the Alaska Dep’t of 
Fish & Game and the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Dep’t of the Interior (Mar. 13, 
1982) (on file with author). 
 130. Recommitment to the Master Memorandum of Understanding, Letter 
from Reg’l FWS Director, Region 7 and Commissioner, Alaska Department of 
Fish & Game, to All Employees of Region 7, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., and the 
Alaska Dep’t of Fish & Game (Nov. 14, 2006) (on file with author).  
 131. Master Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 129 (emphasis 
added).  
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management activities.”132 State wildlife management activities are 
considered “refuge management activities” when they are taken 
“pursuant to a cooperative agreement between the State and the FWS 
where the Refuge Manager has made a written determination that such 
activities support fulfilling the refuge purposes or the System mission.”133 No 
such written determination was made either at the time the MMOU was 
originally written or when the agencies recommitted to it. The MMOU 
also does not refer to specific management activities that would allow a 
refuge manager to even make such a determination. Even if the vague 
statements made in the MMOU could be said to incorporate such 
specific activities as intensive management and predator control, it 
would be impossible to consider these actions as “fulfilling the refuge 
purposes or the System mission.” If the actions considered did fulfill the 
refuge purposes or the System mission, they would be per se compatible 
anyway, regardless of the exception. 
The alternative claim, that the MMOU requires the FWS to defer to 
the state on wildlife management matters, is also without merit. This 
claim seems to be based on the following statement in the MMOU: “The 
Fish and Wildlife Service agrees to recognize the Department [of Fish 
and Game] as the agency with the primary responsibility to manage fish 
and resident wildlife within the State of Alaska.”134 There is no doubt 
that this statement is an accurate reflection of reality. Primary authority 
over wildlife is generally vested in the several states when there is no 
conflicting federal law.135 The U.S. Department of the Interior has 
recognized the truth of this statement several times, but has also 
recognized the government’s power to preempt state law regarding 
wildlife management where necessary.136 The Improvement Act, passed 
                                                 
 132. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 61, § 2.10(A); Final 
Compatibility Policy Pursuant to the National Wildlife Refuge System 
Improvement Act of 1997, 65 Fed. Reg. 62,484, 62,488 (Oct. 18, 2000).  
 133. Final Compatibility Policy Pursuant to the National Wildlife Refuge 
System Improvement Act of 1997, 65 Fed. Reg. 62,484, 62,488 (Oct. 18, 2000) 
(emphasis added). 
 134. Master Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 129. 
 135. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 545 (1976) 
(“Unquestionably the States have broad trustee and police powers over wild 
animals within their jurisdictions.”).  
 136. 43 C.F.R. § 24.3(a) (2009) states: 
In general the States possess broad trustee and police powers over fish 
and wildlife within their borders, including fish and wildlife found on 
Federal lands within a State. Under the Property Clause of the 
Constitution, Congress is given the power to “make all needful Rules 
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to 
the United States.” In the exercise of power under the Property Clause, 
Congress may choose to preempt State management of fish and wildlife 
on Federal lands and, in circumstances where the exercise of power 
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in 1997, unequivocally places the responsibility for management of 
wildlife on NWRS lands in the hands of the FWS.137 This responsibility 
cannot be abandoned by the FWS simply by signing an MMOU that is 
neither approved by Congress nor open to public notice and comment. 
This MMOU and others like it are certainly significant: they facilitate the 
cooperation required by the Improvement Act, ANILCA, and other 
statutes and policies. Such cooperation, however, is only required 
“where practical”—in other words, where it does not conflict with 
existing federal mandates or the ability of the FWS to meet its 
congressionally assigned mission.138 There would be a constitutional 
separation of powers problem if executive agencies could simply avoid 
the implementation of congressional mandates by signing MMOUs with 
the states. In the end, the truth of this position was even recognized by 
the parties who signed the letter of recommitment to the MMOU. While 
that document does not directly recognize the passage of the 
Improvement Act, it does state: “Please read and become familiar with 
the MMOU and practice its cooperative principles to the extent 
possible.”139 While the MMOU is an important component of 
state/federal relations regarding wildlife management on Alaskan 
refuges, it does not change the state of the law, which requires the FWS 
to manage its land and the wildlife found there in accordance with the 
relevant congressional mandates. 
CONCLUSION 
The State of Alaska’s attempts to decrease predator numbers 
through straightforward predator control and other indirect regulations 
stand as an obstacle to accomplishing the mission of the refuge system, 
                                                                                                             
under the Commerce Clause is available, Congress may choose to 
establish restrictions on the taking of fish and wildlife whether or not 
the activity occurs on Federal lands, as well as to establish restrictions 
on possessing, transporting, importing, or exporting fish and wildlife. 
Finally, a third source of Federal constitutional authority for the 
management of fish and wildlife is the treaty making power. 
 137. Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1233–34 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[The 
refuges] cannot fulfill the mission set forth in [the Improvement Act] unless they 
are consistently directed and managed as a national system. . . . Congress 
undoubtedly intended a preeminent federal role for the FWS in the care and 
management of the [refuges].”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
The court noted that it could not “accept the State of Wyoming’s broad and 
absolute challenge . . . to the FWS’s authority to manage wildlife on [refuge 
lands] in a manner with which the state disagrees.” Id. at 1234.  
 138. This qualification is recognized in the language of the original MMOU 
itself. See Master Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 129.  
 139. Recommitment to the Master Memorandum of Understanding, supra 
note 130 (emphasis added).  
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the purposes of the various refuges in Alaska, the healthy population 
mandate of the Improvement Act and ANILCA, and the preservation 
requirements of the Wilderness Act. While the courts require the agency 
to make the case for preemption explicit, the courts have not relieved—
and cannot relieve—the agency of its obligation to preempt state law in 
order to meet its congressional mandates. 
The FWS must take a more proactive role in ensuring that its 
mandates are being met on refuge lands. The state has no interest in 
guaranteeing those mandates on the FWS’s behalf and every reason 
(based on meeting its own mandates and the desire of many of its 
constituents) to expand the sphere of influence of its programs as 
broadly as possible. It is up to the FWS to ensure that Congress’s intent 
is fulfilled. The Improvement Act, ANILCA, and the Wilderness Act 
each contain progressively stronger language indicating that programs 
like intensive wildlife management are generally not appropriate on 
NWRS lands in Alaska. 
 
